One New York Plaza Fire
New York City, NY, USA
What Happened
The August 5, 1970 fire at One New York Plaza, a 50-story office tower in Lower Manhattan, killed two people and burned for hours through upper floors. Investigations documented standpipe system deficiencies among multiple fire protection shortcomings that hampered the FDNY's attack. The fire — along with other high-rise fires of that era — drove major changes to New York's high-rise fire codes, including requirements that made reliable standpipe and sprinkler protection central to high-rise design.
Partially Preventable
Our analysis classifies this failure as partially preventable: testing and maintenance could have reduced the impact or caught contributing deficiencies, but system-level factors — nonstandard equipment, extreme conditions, or infrastructure beyond any single owner's control — also played a major role. Even in these cases, current flow data and documented inspections materially improve response and strengthen the insurance position of affected property owners.
About Standpipe Failure Failures(9 in this database)
In any building taller than hose can be stretched from the street, firefighters depend entirely on the standpipe to move water to the fire floor. Cut or disconnected piping, clogged lines, misadjusted pressure-reducing valves, closed valves, and drained systems have all killed firefighters. NFPA 14 governs standpipe design and acceptance testing; NFPA 25 requires periodic inspection and five-year full-flow testing to prove the system still delivers its designed pressure and volume.
Related Incidents
Would Your System Pass Today?
Routine NFPA 14 & 25 standpipe flow tests and hydrant inspections find failures like this one before a fire does — and keep your insurance coverage intact.
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